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NOTES
LIBEL SUITS AGAINST NEWSPAPERS WHICH REPEAT DEFAMATIONS

Introduction

Normally, a newspaper story is not the result of first-hand information; newspaper reporters cannot be present at all times to see for
themselves the events which they report. As a result, they rely upon
sources of information-statements of others, press dispatches, other
newspaper articles and rumors. Thus, when writing the story the
reporter may use various styles: "John Doe said... ."; "It is reported
that.... ."; "It is rumored that ... ." In the law of libel, this may
present a situation where a person, claiming that the story contained
defamatory statements about himself, will want to know whether he
can successfully sue a newspaper which merely reported, as an item of
news, that others made these statements. The question may also
arise as to the extent of the newspaper's liability where the story is
credited to a news agency, or where the reporter, because of style
technique or other reasons, does not mention the sources of his
information.
The Liability

In the early slander actions it was the rule that a person was
justified if he repeated a slander in good faith believing it to be
true and naming its author.' The courts reasoned that the repeater
gave the defamed person a cause of action against the author by revealing his name, and that listeners could better evaluate the slander
if they knew who originated it. 2 To escape liability under this rule,
the repeater had to mention the name of the author, not merely that
he "heard someone say ....,"; 3 furthermore, the author's name had
to be revealed at the time the repeater spoke the defamatory words
and not at the trial.4 Later slander cases, however, have rejected this
5
rule.

"Davis v. Lewis, 7 T.R. 17, 101 Eng. Rep. 832 (KB. 1796) (by implication); see Tatlow v. Jaquett, 1 Harr. 333, 334 (Del. 1834); Skinner v. Grant,
12 Vt. 456, 461 (1840) ; Earl of Northampton's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 132, 134,
77 Eng. Rep. 1407, 1409 (KB. 1613).
2
See Earl of Northampton's Case, supra note 1.
3
See Davis v. Lewis, supra note 1.
4Id. at 19, 101 Eng. Rep. at 833.
5Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend. 659 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); see Amick v.
Montross, 206 Iova 51, 220 N.W. 51, 53 (1928) ; Stevens v. Hartwell, 52 Mass.
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This rule has never been applied to libel actions 6 because of the
distinctions between libel and slander. The libelous printer causes
greater damage by spreading the news over a large area where people
of the author, and thus
cannot evaluate the character and veracity
t
may more readily believe the repetition. Moreover, with regard to
giving the defamed person a cause of action against the author, words
not slanderous per se require special damages to be actionable, although they may be libelous if written. If the slandered person cannot establish these damages against the author, a fortiori, his only
remedy must be against the8 one who made the spoken words libelous
by repeating them in print.
Since it is argued that it is impossible to make an accurate check
of the pressure
concerning the authenticity of what is reported because
9
to furnish the public with up-to-the-minute news, the question arises
as to whether the newspaper is exempt from a rule that holds the
repeater of a defamation liable.
Several illustrations will show the answer of the courts. In
Rogers v. Courier Post Company 10 the defendant-newspaper quoted
an assistant prosecutor who charged that the plaintiff, a politician, had
"covered up" criminal cases handled by the police. Although the
statements of the assistant prosecutor were accurately and fairly reported without malice, the court held the newspaper liable. In another case,'. where the newspaper reported the poisoning of a family,
the news story mentioned statements of neighbors and the existence
of rumors which implicated the plaintiff. The court held that it was
no defense to repeat the rumors or reports of the neighbors even
though they actually existed. The same result was reached in Cobbs
v. Chicago Defender,12 where the defendant's news article reported
the existence of rumors that the plaintiff was about to be investigated
by a crime commission. Nor was it a justification where the defendant
reprinted a story from another newspaper charging the plaintiff, the
Chief of Police, with arranging a "special job" for his son, even
though the defendant neither affirmed nor denied the charge but
(11 Metc.) 542, 550 (1846); M'Pherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 263, 269-271,
109 Eng. Rep. 448, 450-451 (KB. 1829); see REsTATEMENT, Toars § 578,
comment c, illustration 4 (1938).
6
E.g., De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. 392, 130 Eng. Rep. 1112 (C.P.
1829); M'Gregor v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 24, 107 Eng. Rep. 643 (K.B. 1824);
see Sans v. Joerris, 14 Wis. 663, 667 (1861); see 33 CoL. L. REv. 373, 374
(1933).
7

See De Crespigny v. Wellesley, supra note 6 at 402, 130 Eng. Rep. at

1116.

8 See M'Gregor v. Thwaites, supra note 6.

9 See Werner v. Southern California Assoc. Newspapers, 206 P. 2d 952
(Cal. App. 1949), rev'd, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950) (wherein the same

argument was discussed).

102 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 869 (1949).
11 Republican Pub. Co. v. Miner, 3 Colo. App. 568, 34 Pac. 485 (1893).
12 308 Ill. App. 55, 31 N.E.2d 323 (1941).
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printed it as a straight news story.13 However, if a newspaper merely
referred to a defamatory article appearing in another newspaper or
magazine, without mentioning the contents of the article, it would not5
as opinions of third persons,' 7
be liable. 14 Repeating defamations
6
using the form "it is reported," 1 or printing a paid advertisementl
are all placed in the same category with the repetition of statements,
rumors, and other newspaper articles-if untrue and not privileged,
there is no defense.
The well established rule, formulated from these and other cases,
is that newspapers are liable when accurately repeating what another
has said,' though the article is printed in good faith, 19 naming the
source,2 0 or even where disbelief is expressed in the repeated statements. 2 ' To constitute a defense, it is not sufficient that the person
actually made the statement or that the rumor was in fact circulating;
must prove the truth of the content of the
the repeating newspaper
22
statement or rumor
In holding the repeater liable, the courts, unlike many early
cases, recognize that more is involved than the problem of whether
the repeater is giving the defamed person a cause of action against
the author. Indeed, one court stated that "[t] he stereotyped formulas
of slander, 'they say,' 'it is said,' 'it is generally believed,' are about as
effectual modes of blasting reputation as distinctly and directly to
charge the crime." 23 By circulating the libel, the repeater gives it
currency and raises a suspicion of belief in its truth.24 To free the
23 See Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Wegner, 182 S.W. 45, 48 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916).
14 Cf. MacFadden v. Anthony, 117 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
15 See Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press Co., 46 Mich. 341, 9 N.W. 501 (1881).
16 See World Pub. Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126, 61 N.W. 108 (1894).
17 Cf. Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); see 2 CooLEY,
CONSTITUTONAL LImrrAToNs 940 (8th ed., Carrington, 1927).
18 Walling v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n, 165 App. Div. 26, 150 N.Y.
Supp. 906 (2d Dep't 1914) ; Hegener v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 172 Mo. App. 436,
158 S.W. 54 (1912); Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 869
(1949); see Lubore v. Pittsburgh Courier Pub. Co., 101 F. Supp. 234 (D.D.C.
1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Crowe v. Constitution Pub. Co.,
63 Ga. App. 497, 11 S.E.2d 513 (1940).
1 Rogers v. Courier Post Co., stpra note 18 (fair report without malice);
see Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 124 Iowa 707, 100 N.W. 867, 871
(1904) ; see 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 17 (without knowledge).
20 Dole v. Lyon, supra note 17; see Sans v. Joerris, 14 Wis. 663, 667 (1861);
see Crowe v. Constitution Pub. Co., supra note 18; Houston Chronicle Pub. Co.
v. Wegner, 182 S.W. 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); PRossER, TORTS 812 (1941).
21 Cf. Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill 510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) ; see PROSSER,

TORTS
2 2 812 (1941).

Republican Pub. Co. v. Miner, 3 Colo. App. 568, 34 Pac. 485 (1893);
Dement v. Houston Printing Co., 14 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 37 S.W. 985 (1896) ;
see Ropke v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 9 N.Y. St. R. 709, 713 (B'klyn City Ct.
1887).
23 Johnson v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539, 541 (1877).
24 See Cobbs v. Chicago Defender, 308 Ill. App. 55, 31 N.E2d 323, 325

(1941).
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liability would be to license the reporting
rumors and charges, 25 and would be reNor is this an unwarranted restriction on
which, the United States Supreme Court

. does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous

or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals
or private reputation ....," 27 One court likened the repeating newspaper to the "receiver of stolen goods" and "the disturber of public
peace." 28
A more recent problem, arising from the growth of news gathering agencies, is whether a newspaper should be liable when it repeats
press-agency dispatches transmitted to it from distant parts of the
country.29 This was the question presented in Layne v. Tribune
Company.30 In that case a news dispatch, stating that the plaintiff
was indicted for illegal possession of liquor, was sent from Washington, D. C., by a reliable news agency to the defendant-newspaper in
Tampa, Florida. The court, reasoning that actual malice is essential
to impose liability for a libel, held that the mere repetition of a news
dispatch from a reliable source was not libelous in the absence of any
indication of malice or reckless publication. Consequently, the court
stated that when a newspaper merely repeats a news dispatch in good
faith, not having notice of its defamatory nature, nor having the opportunity to verify the dispatch by its own research, there can be no
malice and, hence, no libel.
The court in the Layne case was in error in assuming that
actual malice is essential to a libel action. Although malice is implied in every libel, the implication arises from the falsity of the publication,3 ' not from any evidence of ill-will or desire to injure; 82 the
implication rests on the fiction that where a wrong is committed the
tortfeasor is presumed to have intended it. 8 However, it is well established that liability attaches even though one, acting without intent
to defame, negligently caused the publication of a libel. 84 Thus, the
mere fact that malice is legally implied does not mean that actual
malice is an essential element to maintain a libel action.
25

See Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447, 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).

28 Ibid.
27
28

28

1927).

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill 510, 513, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).

See 2 COOLEY,

CoNSTiTuTiONAL LimiTATioxs

939-940 (8th ed., Carrington,

108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).
See Lewis and Herrick v. Chapman, 16 N.Y. 369, 372 (1857); see
SEL
LAN, LimBL AND SLANDER 121 (1933).
32
See King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113, 136 (N.Y. 1829); see PRossFa, TORTS
815 (1941).
33 See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281, 291 (1908); see
SE LAN, op. cit. supra note 31, at 124.
34 See Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 63, 126 N.E. 260, 262
(1920); Coleman v. MacLennan, supra note 33; see RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 580
(1938); Note, 26 A.L.R. 454 (1923).
30

31
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Another basis for the holding in the Layne case is that newspaper
practice necessitated the decision: a newspaper could not discharge its
duty of reporting the news promptly if it were required to ". . . warrant the absolute authenticity of every item of its news......35 But

this is a weak argument, since the newspapers could easily protect
themselves by indemnity contracts whereby the press agencies would
accept full responsibility for their dispatches, promising to defend and
pay all damages for any libel suits arising therefrom. Such contracts
would not be illegal provided they were entered into without any
intent that a libel be published. 36 This solution would allow plaintiffs
to avoid jurisdictional hurdles 37 in suing the out-of-state press agency,
would remove any fear in reprinting the dispatches, and would shift
the liability to the press agency which originated the story.
Moreover, in Wood v. Constitution Publishing Company,38 on
facts similar to the Layne case, the court held that a newspaper was
not privileged because it repeated a news-agency dispatch. The
weight of authority, including New York, is in agreement with the
Wood case in its opposition to the Layne decision.3 9
An important aspect, in determining whether a newspaper is
exonerated from liability for repeating defamations, is whether a privilege is extended to the newspaper in publishing the article. For
example, at common law, full and fair reports of judicial or legislative proceedings were qualifiedly privileged. 40 In New York, by
statute, no civil action can be maintained against a newspaper which
fully and fairly reports defamatory statements made during the course
of "any judicial, legislative or other public and official proceedings." 41
This statutory privilege extends to investigations conducted by the
district attorney 42 and to proceedings before a committing magistrate.43 To this extent, therefore, the area of liability for repetition
is reduced.
3 Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234, 239 (1933).

38 Jewett Pub. Co. v. Butler, 159 Mass. 517, 34 N.E. 1087 (1893).
37 See Note, 18 CoRa.L. L.Q. 619, 621 (1933).
3857 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), affd mem., 187 Ga. 377, 200 S.E.

131 (1938).
39 See Szalay v. New York American, Inc., 254 App.Div. 249, 4 N.Y.S.2d
620 (1st Dep't 1938) (repetition of news-agency dispatch considered only on
question of punitive damages); A.H. Bello & Co. v. Smith, 40 S.W. 856 (Tex.
Civ. App.), aff'd, 91 Tex. 221, 42 S.W. 850 (1897); Carey v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 19 Wash. 2d 655, 143 P.2d 857 (1943) ; Note, 86 A.L.R. 475, 476
(1933).
40
See Lee v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., 209 N.Y. 245, 247, 103 N.E. 155
(1913) (judicial proceeding); see Wason v. Walter, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868)
(legislative proceeding).
4zN.Y. Civ. PaAc. Acr § 337.
42 See Baumann v. Newspaper Enterprises, Inc., 270 App. Div. 825, 60
N.Y.S.2d
185, 186 (2d Dep't 1946).
43
Bissell v. Press Pub. Co., 62 Hun 551, 17 N.Y. Supp. 393 (Sup. Ct. 1891)
(Section 1907 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in Section 337 of the Civil
Practice Act, applies to a proceeding before a police magistrate.) ; see Lee v.
Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., supra note 40; Bresslin v. Sun Printing & Pub.
Ass'n, 177 App. Div. 92, 163 N.Y. Supp. 915 (2d Dep't 1917).
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There also exists the qualified privilege of comment and criticism on matters of public interest, 4 but this privilege affords little
protection to the repeating newspaper. Though the subject matter
of an article be unsanitary conditions in a slaughter house, 45 misconduct of a police officer 46 or of a public official, 47 or charging a publisher with forgery 4 5-- all matters of public interest-this privilege
does not extend to a misstatement of fact; it is restricted to comments
on, and criticisms of, facts truly stated.49 Hence, this privilege differs

from that of reporting judicial or legislative proceedings where no
civil action can be maintained even though the repeated statements
are in fact false.5 0
No special privilege is given newspapers because they print the
article in good faith and as a matter of news. 51 "Newspapers have no
greater rights or privileges in this respect than ordinary citizens." 52
The newsworthiness of the story is no justification for printing a
defamation. 53 Moreover, the freedom of speech and press has been
construed to mean ". . . freedom to tell the truth.., and not a license
to spread damaging falsehoods in the guise of news gathering and its
dissemination." 54

44 See Washington Times Co. v. Bonner, 86 F.2d 836, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1936);
Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 33, 96 N.E. 84, 85 (1911).
45 Schwarz Bros. Co. v. Evening News Pub. Co., 84 N.J.L. 486, 87 Atl.
148 46(Sup. Ct. 1913).
Lubore v. Pittsburgh Courier Pub. Co., 101 F. Supp. 234 (D.D.C. 1951),
aff'd, 200 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
47 Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A2d 869 (1949) ; Lindsey v.
Evening Journal Ass'n, 10 N.J. Misc. 1275, 163 Ati. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1932)
(politician).
48 Hearst v. New Yorker Staats Zeitung, 71 Misc. 7, 129 N.Y. Supp. 1089
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mer., 144 App. Div. 896, 129 N.Y. Supp. 1126 (1st Dep't
1911).
49 This privilege is lost if the comment is not the expression of the writer's
real opinion. See Foley v. Press Pub. Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 544, 235 N.Y.
Supp. 340, 351 (1st Dep't 1929). There is also a minority view that the privilege exists even though there be a misstatement of fact. Coleman v. MacLennan,
78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908) ; see Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 215 Pa.
470, 64 Atl. 636, 637 (1906) ; see Note, [1918E] L.R.A. 68.
50 See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 611, comment a (1938).
The newspaperdefendant may have repeated statements false in fact, but the words of Section
337 of the New York Civil Practice Act clearly provide that no civil action
may be maintained against one who reports a legislative or judicial proceeding.
It is not clear whether the privilege granted under Section 337 is absolute, i.e.,
exists even though the writing be malicious. See 28 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 129,
135 (1953). There is a dictum that it is absolute. See Farrell v. New York
Evening Post, Inc., 167 Misc. 412, 415, 3 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
51 See Gilman v. McClatchy, 111 Cal. 606, 44 Pac. 241, 242 (1896); Louisville Times Co. v. Little, 257 Ky. 132, 77 S.W.2d 432, 437 (1934) ; Fenstermaker
v. Tribune Pub. Co., 13 Utah 532, 45 Pac. 1097, 1098 (1896).
52 Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 869, 873 (1949); see
Fitch v. Daily News Pub. Co., 116 Neb. 474, 217 N.W. 947, 948 (1928).
53 See Mallory v. Pioneer Press Co., 34 Minn. 521, 26 N.W. 904, 905 (1886).
54 Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1941),
aff'd mem., 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
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Furthermore, where a qualified privilege inures to the author of
a defamation, because he has made a statement in discharge of some
legal or moral duty to a person having a common interest in the subject matter of the communication, 55 there is a strong argument that
this privilege does not extend to the newspaper which repeats the
statement. The cases indicate that the privilege only encompasses
communications between the interested parties; 66it is lost when the
communication is transmitted to those who do not share a common
interest in its subject matter. Thus, statements made in a publication
of a credit agency concerning the credit rating of the plaintiff were
held not privileged since the publication was sent to businessmen who
did not deal with the plaintiff. 57 Also, where a person, uttering defamatory statements in a pamphlet which expressed his views on proposed legislation, was protected by a qualified privilege, this privilege
was lost when he distributed the pamphlet to persons not connected
with the hearings on the legislation. 58 It is true that this privilege is
extended to publication of alleged defamations in newspapers of restricted circulation, such as religious 59 and labor newspapers. 60 However, since the readers of these papers are church or union members,
the privilege is given on the theory that information was being transmitted to interested parties, The ratio decidendi of these cases limits
the privilege to communications between interested parties; consequently, a newspaper of general circulation, repeating the communication to a heterogeneous audience, would not be protected by the
privilege.6 ' In fact, in Kimball v. Post Publishing Company,62 it was
held that, although statements of a stockholder made at a stockholders'
meeting were privileged, the privilege did not extend to the newspaper which repeated the statements.
Nevertheless, the meetings of certain groups, wherein the par55
See Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N.Y. 27, 30-31, 96 N.E. 84, 85 (1911);
Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N.Y. 188, 193 (1871); see RESTATEMENT, ToRTs
§§ 594-598 (1938) (for areas of this privilege).
8 See Over v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 191, 26 N.E. 91 (1885); Vail v. Pennsylvania R.R., 103 N.J.L. 213, 136 AtI. 425 (Sup. Ct. 1927); see Bereman v.
Power Pub. Co., 93 Colo. 581, 27 P.2d 749, 751 (1933); Kimball v. Post Pub.
Co., 199 Mass. 248, 85 N.E. 103, 105 (1908).
5 Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, supra note 55.
58
Woods v. Wiman, 122 N.Y. 445, 25 N.E. 919 (1890).
19 Redgate v. Roush, 61 Kan. 480, 59 Pac. 1050 (1900) (The fact that the
report in the church paper is incidentally brought to the attention of persons,
other than members of the congregation, will not result in loss of the privilege.) ;
Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501 (1879); see Moyle v. Franz, 267 App. Div.
423, 425, 46 N.Y.S.2d 667, 669 (2d Dep't), aff'd men., 293 N.Y. 842, 59 N.E.2d
437 (1944); Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501, 144 At. 787, 789 (1929) ; see
Note,
6 0 63 A.L.R. 649, 656 (1929).
Bereman v. Power Pub. Co., supra note 56.
6
1 However, where a person has a qualified privilege to reply to a defamation, this privilege may extend to the newspaper which prints the reply. Preston
v. Hobbs, 161 App. Div. 363, 146 N.Y. Supp. 419 (1st Dep't 1914); accord,
Israel v. Portland News Pub. Co., 152 Ore. 225, 53 P.2d 529 (1936).
62 199 Mass. 248, 85 N.E. 103 (1908).
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ticipants share a common interest-such as church tribunals, 63 water
boards 64 and medical societies 65 -may be considered quasi-judicial
or official proceedings, and newspaper reports of statements made at
these meetings will be privileged. In New York, it is questionable
whether the immunity afforded by Section 337 of the Civil Practice
Act 66 extends to the reporting of all group meetings. In one case the
court stated that Section 337 did not extend to the reporting of a
speech given at a meeting of a philanthropic society.6 7 The Court of
Appeals, in construing the phrase of Section 337, ". . . or other public
and official proceedings ...." said these words are to be read in con-

junction with the words "judicial" and "legislative." 68 It would appear, therefore, that in order for the newspaper to come under the
protection of Section 337, the meeting it reports must be of a judicial
or legislative nature.
A final consideration of the liability of the repeating newspaper
is a determination of the effect of its repetition on the author of the
libel or slander. A newspaper will not be held liable for the additional
damage caused by the republication of its defamatory article, unless
the newspaper induced or aided in the republication.6 9 Likewise, the
person whose slanderous words are reported by the newspapers will
not be liable for the republication if he did not authorize or induce
their republication in the newspaper.70 Unless induced, the repetition of the slander is not deemed the natural consequence of the first1
publication, and is treated as an independent act of a third party.7
The difficulty in these cases arises as to the meaning of the words
"authorize" and "induce." Merely answering questions of reporters
without more does not attach liability; 2 but the author has been held
liable for republication of his slander where the reporter told him he
63 See Warren v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 336 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934);
see Shurtleff v. Stevens, su=pra note 59 at 518.
64 See Briarcliff Lodge Hotel, Inc. v. Citizen-Sentinel Publishers, Inc., 260
N.Y. 106, 118, 183 N.E. 193, 197 (1932) (water board a "public official" and
protected by Section 337 of the New York Civil Practice Act).
15 See Barrows v. Bell, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 301 (1856).
66 "A civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or corporation, for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial, legislative or
other public and official proceedings....
"This section does not apply to a libel contained in any other matter added
by 6any person concerned in the publication . . . "
7See Sarasohn v. Workingmen's Pub. Ass'n, 44 App. Div. 302, 304, 60 N.Y.
Supp. 640, 641 (1st Dep't 1899). This case, however, may be distinguished
since the defendant added its own comments to the report of the meeting. Section 337 of the New York Civil Practice Act does not extend the privilege to
added matter. See note 66 supra.
68 See Danziger v. Hearst Corp., 304 N.Y. 244, 249, 107 N.E.2d 62, 65 (1952).
69Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Waterman, 188 Ala. 272, 66 So. 16 (1913).
70 Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N.Y. 12, 56 N.E. 502 (1900); see Note, 16
A.L.R. 726 (1922).
72 See Schoepflin v. Coffey, supra note 70 at 17-18, 56 N.E. at 504.
72 Schoepflin v. Coffey, supra note 70.
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would publish the information and the author later volunteered more
73
information.
Damages and Evidence
Once liability is established, the repeating newspaper's only solace
lies in the field of punitive damages. Since this is so, it is extremely
important that plaintiffs' complaints in such libel actions contain no
demand for punitive damages unless a clear case of actual malice can
be established. The demand for punitive damages may lose a libel
suit.
The term "compensatory damages" refers to the actual damages
that result from a libel and may include loss of reputation and mental
suffering. 74 To obtain "punitive damages," which are awarded as a
75
punishment to the defendant and as a warning to others, the plaintiff must show that the newspaper printed the article with actual
malice, 70 as distinguished from that malice which is fictitiously implied
in every libel. Actual malice is proven by showing that the defendant
recklessly
was actuated by personal ill will or published the
77 article
with "wanton disregard" for the plaintiff's rights.
In order to disprove actual malice, and thus to mitigate the punitive damages, decisional law 78 and the statutes of several states, 79 including Section 338 of the New York Civil Practice Act,80 allow the
defendant to introduce into evidence his sources of information and
any circumstances which caused him to believe in the truth of the
libel. Included in the category of evidence that demonstrates the lack
73

Valentine v. Gonzalez, 190 App. Div. 490, 179 N.Y. Supp. 711 (1st Dep't
1920).
74

See Osterheld v. Star Co., 146 App. Div. 388, 393, 131 N.Y. Supp. 247,
(2d Dep't 1911).
250-251
75
See Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A2d 869, 875 (1949).
76 Hollien v. Tarrytown Daily News, Inc., 235 App. Div. 869, 257 N.Y.
Supp. 543 (2d Dep't 1932); see Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58,
65-66, 126 N.E. 260, 263 (1920).
77 See Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., supra note 76 at 66-67, 126 N.E. at
263; Gressman v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 197 N.Y. 474, 90 N.E. 1131 (1910);
v. Star Co., 166 App. Div. 89, 151 N.Y. Supp. 660 (2d Dep't 1915).
Bresslin
8

7 Varvaro v. American Agriculturist, Inc., 222 App. Div. 213, 225 N.Y.

Supp. 564 (1st Dep't 1927); Hains v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 138
Misc. 504, 240 N.Y. Supp. 734 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich.
742, 3 N.W. 216 (1879) ; Hewitt v. Pioneer-Press Co., 23 Minn. 178 (1876);
Callahan v. Ingram, 122 Mo. 355, 26 S.W. 1020 (1894).
79 See, e.g., MAss. LAws ANN. c. 231, §94 (Supp. 1953); MicH. Comp.
LAws § 620.19 (1948); N.H. REv. LA.ws c. 391, § 6 (1942); VA. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 8-632 (1950).
80 "In an action for libel or slander, the defendant may prove mitigating circumstances, including the sources of his information and the grounds for his

belief. . . ." In the law of defamation, evidence in "mitigation" applies only
to punitive damages. Young v. Fox, 26 App. Div. 261, 49 N.Y. Supp. 634
(1st Dep't 1898). "Mitigation extends or relates only to punitive or exemplary
damages." Wuensch v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 4 App. Div. 110, 115, 38 N.Y.
Supp. 605, 607 (1st Dep't 1896).
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of malice are rumors, 8 ' common gossip,8 2 statements of others,8 3
documents, 8 4 letters 85 and police blotters.8 6 The newspaper may also

disprove actual malice by showing that the information was received
from a reliable press agency 87 or was copied from an article in another newspaper,8 8 and that the dispatch or article was repeated in
good faith.8 9 These sources of information need not be mentioned in
the news story,90 although there is some authority to the contrary. 91
The reason for admitting evidence of sources of information,
rumors and statements of others is that such evidence, while not
proving the truth of the libel, tends toward such proof and thus raises
92
an inference that the defendant was not motivated by actual malice.
But the issue of malice is irrelevant on the question of compensatory
damages which are awarded regardless of the ill will or motives of
the defendant; 98 no matter how much the defendant was misled by
information derived from reliable sources, the plaintiff is entitled to
9 4
his full compensatory damages.
The defendant can completely escape liability if he proves the
truth of the alleged libel,9 5 but in. proving truth in a libel action the
81 See Abell v. Cornwall Industrial Corp., 241 N.Y. 327, 338, 150 N.E. 132,
136 (1925); Brown v. McArthur, 106 App. Div. 366, 367, 94 N.Y. Supp. 537,
538 (3d Dep't 1905).
s2 Darling v. Mansfield, 222 Mich. 278, 192 N.W. 595 (1923) (slander ac-

tion)
; Hoboken Printing & Pub. Co. v. Kahn, 58 N.J.L. 359, 33 AtI. 382 (1895).
83
Kershaw v. Steurer, 138 App. Div. 211, 123 N.Y. Supp. 77 (1st Dep't
1910); see RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 247 (7th ed. 1948).
84 See Callahan v. Jones, 122 Mo. 355, 26 S.W. 1020 (1894) (certificates
of completion on public construction projects admitted in slander case).
85 Collis v. Press Pub. Co., 68 App. Div. 38, 74 N.Y. Supp. 78 (1st Dep't
1902)
(correspondence between commissioner of public works and comptroller).
8
Kershaw v. Steurer, supra note 83.
87 Goodrow v. Malone Telegram, Inc., 235 App. Div. 3, 255 N.Y. Supp. 812
(3d Dep't 1932); see Szalay v. New York American, Inc., 254 App. Div. 249,
251, 4 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622 (1st Dep't 1938) (good faith publication of newsagency dispatch only mitigates punitive damages).
88 Hewitt v. Pioneer-Press Co., 23 Minn. 178 (1876) ; see Morse v. TimesRepublican
Printing Co., 124 Iowa 707, 100 N.W. 867, 870 (1904).
89
See Szalay v. New York American, Inc., supra note 87 (news dispatch);
Carpenter v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 96 App. Div. 376, 382, 89
N.Y.
Supp. 263, 267 (1st Dep't 1904) (news article).
90
See Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 13 Utah 532, 45 Pac. 1097, 1099
(1896).
91
9 2 Cf. Wallace v. Homestead Co., 117 Iowa 348, 90 N.W. 835 (1902).
See Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N.Y. 624, 634, 42 N.E. 270, 273 (1895) ; Ellis
v. Wood,
108 Misc. 478, 480, 177 N.Y. Supp. 730, 732 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
93
See Remsen v. Bryant, 24 Misc. 238, 240, 52 N.Y. Supp. 515, 516-517
(Sup. Ct. 1898), aff'd, 36 App. Div. 240, 56 N.Y. Supp. 728 (2d Dep't 1899);
Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 869, 875 (1949).
94 Szalay v. New York American, Inc., 254 App. Div. 249, 4 N.Y.S.2d 620
(1st Dep't 1938); see Osterheld v. Star Co., 146 App. Div. 388, 392, 131 N.Y.
Supp.
95 247, 250 (2d Dep't 1911).
See Roeber v. New Yorker Staats Zeitung, 1 App. Div. 427, 428, 37 N.Y.
Supp. 255, 256 (1st Dep't 1896).
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96
Hearsay evidefendant must abide by the usual rules of evidence.
dence is, therefore, generally inadmissible. Thus, in Meeker v. Post
Printing& Publishing Contpany,97 the truth of a charge that plaintiff
had mistreated her mother could not be proven by the testimony of
witnesses (the plaintiff's brothers and neighbors) that the98mother told
them how the plaintiff mistreated her. In another case, the defendant newspaper described the plaintiff as a fugitive charged with
forgery. To prove the truth of the charge, the defendant introduced
testimony of a witness who was in the district attorney's office at the
time the plaintiff was being investigated. The witness was allowed
to narrate what this investigation disclosed and his opinion of the
plaintiff's guilt. The defendant's reporter then testified to a conversation between himself and a former lawyer of the plaintiff, in which
the reporter referred to the plaintiff as a "jailbird" and the lawyer,
by innuendo, said it was true. The Appellate Division held that such
evidence was hearsay and inadmissible to prove the truth of the charge.
This same evidence, however, would not be inadmissible as hearsay if it were introduced to show, in mitigation of punitive damages,
lack of actual malice. For example, in Kershaw v. Steurer,99 the
court held that it was proper, in mitigation of punitive damages, for
the defendant's editor to testify as to any circumstances which caused
him to believe the story true before he wrote it. It was competent,
therefore, for the editor to testify that he checked his story with the
police blotter, the defrauded persons and another reporter. Such
testimony could include not only the statement that he did these things,
but also what the results of the investigation disclosed. 100 The court
stated that although such evidence would be hearsay on the question
of truth, it was relevant and competent to disprove malice.' 0 '
Thus, in proving want of malice, the defendant could introduce
the very testimony that would be inadmissible as hearsay on the issue
of truth. The rule of the Kershaw case would allow a reporter to
testify that the victims of a fraud told him that the plaintiff defrauded
them, although the defendant was unable to get one of the victims to
so testify. The reporter would also be permitted to relate the contents of the police blotter or what other police officers told him without bringing the blotter or the police officers into court.
In brief, any evidence admissible to show the absence of malice,
such as statements and letters of third parties, rumors, and reports,
will tend to lead the jury to believe in the truth of the alleged libel,
even though they have been instructed by the judge to regard such
evidence only to determine punitive damages.

96 See El Paso Times Co. v. Eicke, 292 S.W. 594, 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
97 55 Colo. 355, 135 Pac. 457 (1913).
98 Carpenter v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 96 App. Div. 376, 89
N.Y. Supp. 263 (1st Dep't 1904).
99 138 App. Div. 211, 123 N.Y. Supp. 77 (1st Dep't 1910).

00 Id. at 213, 123 N.Y. Supp. at 78.
101 Ibid.
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A similar situation occurs when the reputation of the plaintiff is
in issue. Since a large element of the damages in a libel action is
loss of reputation, 10 2 a person with a bad reputation is deemed to
have suffered less damages from a defamation than one who is respected in the community. 10 3 However, to show plaintiff's bad reputation, the defendant may not evidence the existence of reports or
rumors concerning the plaintiff; 104 nor may a newspaper argue that
other newspapers have so destroyed the plaintiff's reputation with the
same libel that its own libelous publication could not have done much
damage. 10 5 That others have defamed the plaintiff is no defense to
a libel action. 10 6 The previous defamations may have been lightly
regarded whereas their repetition may encourage belief.' 0 7 Moreover,
to hold otherwise would be to put the plaintiff in the position of either
refraining from suit, and thus permitting the continuance of the rumors
and reports, or of bringing an action wherein these very same rumors
and reports will be used against him to minimize the damages. 08
To prove bad reputation the defendant is relegated to two procedures. He may cross-examine the plaintiff, and in so doing, question
him about his reputation or cast doubt upon his veracity as a person
or as a witness. Secondly, the defendant may introduce witnesses to
testify regarding their opinions of the plaintiff's general reputation; 109
but such witnesses could not testify that the plaintiff "is reported to
have done this" or "rumor says he did this." 110 Yet the jury will
hear of the existence of these rumors, reports and articles from other
newspapers-evidence which the defendant could not use to show bad
reputation-when the defendant is disproving lack of malice.
Conclusion
Many newspaper editors, aware of their newspapers' liability for
the repetition of a defamation, nevertheless, when deciding to print
an article, which is libelous on its face if untrue, are guided by a policy
102 See Osterheld v. Star Co., 146 App. Div. 388, 393, 131 N.Y. Supp. 247,
250-251
(2d Dep't 1911).
20 3 See Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Schenck, 98 Fed. 925, 928 (2d Cir.
1900);
Osterheld v. Star Co., supra note 102.
04
1
Wuensch v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 4 App. Div. 110, 38 N.Y. Supp. 605
(1st Dep't 1896) ; Mapes v. Weeks, 4 Wend. 659 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830) (slander
action); Hearne v. DeYoung, 132 Cal. 357, 64 Pac. 576 (1901); Bragg v.

Hammack, 155 Va. 419, 155 S.E. 683 (1930); see Abell v. Cornwall Industrial
Corp., 241 N.Y. 327, 338, 150 N.E. 132, 136 (1925) ; see RicHAPIsoN, EvmNcE
§ 125 (7th ed. 1948). But cf. Republican Pub. Co. v. Mosman, 15 Colo. 399,
24 Pac. 1051 (1890).
205
Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Schenck, supra note 103.
20076 See Bragg v. Hammack, supra note 104, 155 S.E. at 687.
2 See Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Schenck, supra note 103 at 927.
108 See Mapes v. Weeks, supra note 104 at 663 (slander action).
109 See Wuensch v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 4 App. Div. 110, 115-116, 38 N.Y.
Supp. 605, 607-608 (1st Dep't 1896).
110 See SEELMAx, LIBM AND SLANm § 306 (1933).
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of "calculated risk." The editor,' after concluding that the article
would appeal to his readers, considers whether there is any possibility

of a libel suit resulting from its publication. This latter consideration
is governed by the editor's awareness-developed from past experiences-of those people who are litigious. The editor knows, for
example, that certain public figures, people of very limited means, or
persons with unsavory pasts will usually not sue. Thus, if the potential plaintiff falls into the non-litigious category, the editor will risk
a lawsuit and print the article.

However, the newspaper will be discouraged from printing

articles on the basis of "calculated risk" if the risk becomes too

expensive.112 They will be less inclined to print potentially libelous

articles if more people are aware that they have causes of action

against the newspaper. An awareness of the newspaper's liability for
repeating statements of others, reports, rumors and press dispatches,
together with a realization of the hidden dangers involved in seeking
punitive damages, should encourage libeled parties to bring suit when
their rights to a good name have been violated by a newspaper.

PRIVILEGED TESTIMONY UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Introduction
In its origin, bankruptcy law was penal in nature.' It was based
upon the premise that all debtors are dishonest, and was designed as
a means of retribution. As civilization developed, however, it was
recognized that one might become insolvent through circumstances
entirely beyond his control. Bankruptcy law gradually became an instrument of reorganization and rehabilitation rather than of punishment and revenge. As a result, modem legislation in this field is
remedial in nature 2 and is advantageous to the unfortunate debtor as
well as to his creditors. In general, the insolvent may begin anew
financially, while those to whom he is indebted are satisfied as fully
as possible out of the assets available upon the adjudication of bankruptcy. In this manner the principles of justice are preserved and
the interests of all the parties are protected.

III Although many large newspaper companies have legal departments (often
located in the same building), news stories are usually not pre-censored by the
legal departments.
112

See THomAs, LaEL AND SLANDER 54-57 (1949)

(charts showing the

amount of damages that have been awarded for various defamatory statements).
See NADLER, TnE LAw oF BANKRUPrCY § 1 (1948).
2Ibid.

